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Abstract 
The question of how ordinary people understand the concept of virtue is under-scrutinized. The 
current study highlights incongruities between strengths of the VIA-IS and features ‘laypeople’ 
instinctively associate with virtue. In Study 1 we examined freely-listed features associated 
with virtue in 189 participants (20 – 81 years). In Study 2 (N= 205, 18 – 84 years) we found 
features of ‘virtue’ which overlapped with ‘good character’ and ‘moral persons’, in addition to 
features uniquely associated with ‘virtue’.  Studies 3a and 3b (N= 105, 18 – 73 years) partially 
corroborated the prototypical structure of virtue, however, demonstrated some inconsistencies 
in perceptions of virtue-features. Given lay understandings of virtue can be at odds with 
academic frameworks, this stresses the importance of definitions and guidance when measuring 
virtue concepts. The current studies signal future research avenues; cross-cultural and 
qualitative examinations of lay conceptions of virtue, and the possibility of developing new 
measures and frameworks informed by lay conceptions. 
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Introduction 
Recently there has been renewed academic interest in character strengths and virtues. 
However, the question remains whether nonprofessional understandings of virtue reflect 
scholarly conceptions. The present study offers insight into laypeople’s conceptions of virtue 
and how this compares with the VIA classification (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), the dominant 
approach to strengths and virtues within positive psychology. It references Ruch and Proyer’s 
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(2015) mapping of the VIA strengths into the six virtue categories, and compares ‘virtue’ with 
existing examinations of ‘highly moral persons’ (Walker & Pitts, 1998) and ‘good character’ 
(Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). 
Has the word ‘virtue’ lost traction in the modern world (Kesebir & Kesebir, 2012)? One 
way to illuminate this question (used in the current study) is to adopt the approach of prototype 
analysis, the first step of which is to ask laypeople what features they believe characterise a 
given concept (in this case, ‘virtue’).  
It will be appreciated that the ‘bottom-up’ free listing task used here, the first stage of the 
method of prototype analysis, yields a spontaneous assessment of features associated with 
virtue, and the degree to which the virtues instinctively named by non-professionals compare 
with the strengths and virtues positive psychologists have deemed worthy of inclusion in the 
VIA (which remains the leading classification of strengths and virtues currently in use).1 This 
is in contrast to Ruch and Proyer (2015), who took the existence of the twenty four strengths 
of the VIA as read, requiring participants to map these strengths onto the six superordinate 
virtues of the classification. That is, whilst Ruch and Proyer asked participants to work within 
the parameters of the VIA, the current study incorporates free listing of virtue features. 
Participants were given a blank slate onto which they spontaneously inscribed features of 
virtue; thus tapping into a lay understanding, unmediated by existing models of virtue. 
It should be noted at this juncture, that Peterson and Seligman (2004) used the concept of 
virtue in a highly specific way. They defined virtues as superordinate categories within the VIA 
classification that are exemplified by subordinate ‘character strengths’. They identified six 
superordinate virtue categories: wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, transcendence and 
 
1 Cawley, Martin & Johnson (2000) developed the Virtues Scale, a 140-item self-report measure of virtues 
created using the lexical tradition (Brokken, 1978). Though this preceded the VIA-IS, the measure has been 
little used and has effectively been superseded by the much-popularised VIA-IS. 
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temperance. Peterson and Seligman (2004) proposed that these six virtues are operationalised 
through the twenty-four character strengths of the VIA-IS. However, this ‘two-level’ 
conception of how character strengths relate to virtues could be disputed by both ‘experts’ 
(philosophers or psychologists) and by laypeople, on the grounds that there is substantial 
overlap in the meaning of ‘character strengths’ and ‘virtues’ in ordinary language. The 
understanding of character strengths as embodying ‘routes to the virtues’ is therefore specific 
and idiosyncratic to the VIA-IS.  
In any event, factor analyses of the VIA-IS have failed to confirm a six-factor solution in 
support of the superordinate virtue categories described above. While McGrath and Walker 
(2016) suggested a four-factor solution in youths aged 10-17, McGrath (2015) identified three 
virtue factors in the VIA-IS (caring, inquisitiveness and self-control) – a finding corroborated 
more recently by McGrath, Greenberg and Hall-Simmonds (2018). Thus, even when the VIA 
character strengths are taken to be definitive, the precise loadings of individual character 
strengths onto overarching virtue categories can be disputed. 
 
Virtue and Virtue Ethics  
Interest in virtue has been growing in moral philosophy, education and psychology. A virtue 
is a trait, disposition or quality deemed to be morally good. Virtues are valued because they 
contribute to an individual’s own moral good and, by extension, the good of society (Annas 
2011; Kristjánsson, 2015). There has been a corresponding interest in ‘virtue ethics’ (Annas, 
2011; MacIntyre, 1981). A virtue ethicist focuses less on moral behaviour, viewed in isolation, 
and more on the moral character of individuals, whose thinking, feeling, motivation and action 
is permeated by the virtues they embody. Whether it is deemed morally acceptable to lie or 
steal depends not on a universal law or on its overall pro-social consequences (as the moral 
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theories of deontology or consequentialism assume), but on whether an individual acted from 
the virtues they exemplify. 
As noted, Peterson and Seligman’s (2004) VIA classification encompasses twenty-four 
‘character strengths’ which are ‘the psychological ingredients – processes or mechanisms – 
that define the virtues’ (Peterson & Seligman, p. 13). As we saw, within the VIA-IS there are 
six overarching virtues (wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance and 
transcendence). Ruch and Proyer (2015) asked 70 experts and 41 laypeople to rate how 
prototypical each of the previously identified character strengths are for each of the six virtues. 
They thus sought an alternative means of assigning strengths to superordinate virtue categories 
than factor analysis, the method adopted by McGrath (2015), McGrath & Walker (2016) and 
McGrath, Greenberg and Hall-Simmonds (2018).  It will be appreciated that Ruch and Proyer 
(2015) assumed the existence of the twenty-four character strengths of the VIA-IS; what they 
sought to examine was whether each of the twenty-four strengths were accurately categorised 
within the six superordinate virtue types. 
Despite, the growing prominence of the concept of virtue in psychology (Damon & Colby, 
2015; Fowers, 2005), there has been relatively little examination of what this concept means 
to the general public. This study, using prototype analysis, elucidates lay understandings of 
virtue by spontaneously eliciting virtues and virtue features from nonprofessional people. It 
departs substantially, therefore, from the factor analyses of the VIA-IS and from Ruch and 
Proyer’s (2015) study mapping the character strengths to superordinate virtue categories. 
Prototype analysis has been applied to a range of concepts and, importantly for the current 
study, those include ‘moral persons’ (Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Skalski & Basinger, 2011; Walker 
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& Pitts, 1998) and ‘good character’ (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001).2 A prototype study of virtue 
complements existing prototype analyses of these allied concepts, enabling the unique features 
of virtue and its degree of overlap with these concepts to be examined.  
 
Prototype Analysis 
Rosch (1977) found that people tend to categorize many concepts based on how closely they 
map onto prototypical exemplars of a category.3 Within the category ‘fruit’, an apple would be 
deemed more representative (i.e. prototypical) than an olive, which is more removed from the 
most prototypical examples, and shares fewer family resemblances with them. The unique taste 
of an olive does not match the prototype that most fruit is sweet, rendering an olive less 
prototypical of the concept of fruit than, say, a pear. 
To establish a prototypical structure, it must be shown that some features of the concept are 
more representative or central than others. This is usually achieved by asking people to list 
features of a concept, which are subsequently rated for centrality/importance. This process 
allows a ‘nucleus’ of central concept features to be identified, around which comparatively 
peripheral, marginal and remote concept features can be classified. 
To validate a prototypical structure, it must be shown that feature centrality influences 
cognition relating to the concept. Methods drawing on both implicit and explicit processes have 
been developed to this end. Implicit recognition and recall memory tasks assume that central 
concept features are more likely to be remembered than peripheral or remote features, 
indicative of feature centrality impacting cognition. While recognition memory tends to yield 
 
2 Vauclair, Wilson & Fischer’s (2014) paper on laypeople’s associations of ‘moral character’ across four countries 
is also pertinent, though the cross-cultural nature of this research and its distinctive methodology make it unsuited 
for direct comparison with the current analysis. 
3 This applies to so-called open textured entities (as opposed to mathematical or logical entities which can be 
defined by one or more individually necessary and jointly sufficient criteria). 
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results in the predicted direction (Fehr, 1988; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Lambert, Graham, & 
Fincham, 2009), attempts to corroborate the prototypical structure of concepts using recall 
memory have performed less consistently (Fehr, 1988; Kearns & Fincham, 2004; Lapsley & 
Lasky, 2001).  Thus whether a concept is found to have a prototypical structure may depend to 
some extent on the method, and it is not clear whether findings which fail to corroborate 
prototypicality are consistently reported; the so-called ‘file drawer problem’ (Rosenthal, 1979). 
Greater convergence of measures of internal structure (implicit or explicit) affords greater 
confidence in establishing that a concept is prototypically organized. However, from a 
statistical point of view it follows that as the number of methods of corroborating prototypical 
structure increases, so too does the probability of finding discrepant results.  
Prototype analysis makes a contribution towards defining concepts from a ‘bottom-up’ lay 
perspective (Hardy et al., 2011; SecondAuthor et al, 2014), as opposed to circumscribing them 
from a ‘top-down’, ‘expert’ or ‘specialist’ point of view. This allows concepts to be examined 
without imposing a priori biases (see Walker & Pitts, 1998, p. 404). In the current study, the 
concept of virtue is examined from a lay perspective – a group unfamiliar with the VIA 
classification and its associated (and idiosyncratic) understanding of virtues as superordinate 
categories embodied by specific character strengths. Using a lay sample, one could expect the 
six ‘core’ virtues of the VIA-IS to be named as central features of the concept of virtue. What 
is less certain is whether participants would associate all twenty-four character strengths of the 
VIA-IS with the concept of virtue, which one might expect, if these strengths are taken to be 
the ‘routes’ to embodying the virtues. 
 
Overview of Studies 1, 2 and 3 
The main aim of this study was to examine how people conceptualise virtue. This has 
 8 
received insufficient research attention to date, with the implication that scholars could be 
projecting their own understandings of virtue (including its structural relationship to character 
strengths) onto nonprofessionals. In Study 1, we examined features typically associated with 
the concept of virtue. In Study 2, a separate group of participants rated how central the features 
identified in Study 1 were to the concept of virtue, and compared the degree of overlap between 
‘virtue’ and previously examined prototypes of ‘moral persons’ (Walker & Pitts, 1998) and 
‘good character’ (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001). Following previous research by SecondAuthor et 
al (2014), we combined frequency scores (from Study 1) with centrality scores (from Study 2) 
to create a combined ‘sum of ranks’ metric.4 This was used in Study 3a to examine how 
centrality and frequency of features affected people’s assessments of whether a fictitious 
character was deemed virtuous, and in Study 3b, where a recognition task was used to see 
whether participants falsely recognized more central than peripheral features of virtue. 
 
Study 1 
In Study 1 participants listed the features they believed exemplified the concept of virtue, 




One–hundred–and–eighty-nine adults participated via an online survey. Participants were 
recruited via a crowdsourcing website and were paid £1.00 in return for participation. All 
 
4 To strike a balance between the more instantaneous responses of Study 1 and the more considered judgements 
of Study 2. 
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participants were UK citizens. Of the sample, 49.7% of participants were female. Ages ranged 
from 20 – 81 years (M = 47 years). Eighty-nine percent were White-British. When asked about 
their highest qualification, 53% reported having GCSEs, A-levels or vocational qualifications, 
34% of the sample had a higher education degree and 9% had completed a postgraduate 
qualification. Fifty percent of the sample was Christian and 36% were Atheist or Agnostic. Of 
those who identified with a religion, 22% indicated that they practiced it. 
 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were instructed to list the features and characteristics they think typify the concept 
of virtue. Instructions were adapted from Fehr and Russell (1984) and Second Author et al. 
(2014):  
“We are exploring what characteristics and attributes people think of when 
they hear the word virtue. For example, if you were asked to list the 
characteristics of the concept of gratitude you might write “thankful”, 
“appreciation”, “expressing thanks”, “feel guilty”, “crying”, “obligation to 
return favour” and so on. Here we would like you to list the features and 
characteristics that you think are typical of the concept of virtue. We would like 
to know what you understand by the term virtue, what features/characteristics 
you believe exemplify a virtuous act or virtuous person.  
It may help to think about this task as if you are explaining the word virtue to 
someone who has never heard the term before. So think about what virtue is 
and the actions, emotions, thoughts and feelings that are involved. We are 
interested in any positive or negative attributes of virtue; therefore we would 
like you to also rate the positivity or negativity of each feature you come up with 
on the scale provided.” 
Participants rated the valence of their self-generated features using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
very negative to 5 = very positive); this was done in parallel with feature generation. The survey 
took an average of 7 minutes to complete. 
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Results and Discussion 
A complete list of 1407 virtue features was generated (M = 8 features). These were grouped 
by linguistic and semantic similarity (see Fehr, 1988; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972) and 
subsequently coded into larger categories by two independent raters. Items sharing word roots 
were categorized together, for example ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’.  Next, the raters evaluated 
features based on semantic meaning; features with similar meanings were placed in the same 
category. For example, ‘brave’ and ‘courageous’ were combined. Responses containing more 
than one feature were counted as multiple features. 
In preparation for assessing the level of agreement in coding, the two raters established the 
features for analysis. Disagreements were resolved by a third researcher. This resulted in 127 
virtue features. Of these, 28 were named by only one or two respondents and were discarded, 
leaving 99 key virtue features (see Table 1). As is usual practice in prototype analyses, 
agreement between the raters was assessed with Cohen’s Kappa (K = 0.95). 
Participants identified 99 key virtue features. They recognised general features, such as 
‘good/goodness’ (46%), ‘moral/morality’ (42%), and ‘ethical’ (12%). They also named 
specific virtues such as ‘honesty/truthfulness’ (48%) and ‘trust/trustworthy’ (17%). 
Participants named some - but not all - of the ‘character strengths’ from the VIA classification 
as features of virtue (see Table 2).  
Notably, participants rated most virtue features positively (M= 4.16, SD= 0.66). Only four 
features were assigned a negative valence: ‘smug/smugness’, ‘self-righteous’ 
‘arrogant/boastful’, and ‘gullible’, though these were referenced infrequently (see Table 1). As 
Table 2 clearly shows, fourteen out of the twenty-four character strengths of the VIA were 
mentioned in our sample, it should be noted, however, that eight of these character strengths 
were identified by less than 5% of the sample.  
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The VIA character strengths of ‘creativity’, ‘curiosity’, ‘judgement’, ‘love of learning’, 
‘perspective’, ‘zest’, ‘social intelligence’, ‘teamwork’, ‘leadership’ and ‘appreciation of 
beauty’ did not feature in the sample.  These strengths, said to ‘exemplify’ superordinate virtues 
of the VIA, were not mentioned. Within the category of wisdom, none of the five VIA 
‘character strengths’ (‘creativity’, ‘curiosity’, ‘judgement’, ‘love of learning’ and 
‘perspective’) were named as features, which one might have expected if laypeople see these 
strengths as being typical examples (‘exemplifications’) of the virtue of wisdom. The same 
applies to ‘social intelligence’ manifesting the virtue of humanity and ‘teamwork’ and 
‘leadership’ exhibiting the virtue of justice. 
The higher-order VIA virtue categories of ‘humanity’, ‘temperance’ and ‘transcendence’ 
were not named in this sample (see Table 1). This suggests that participants in our sample did 
not associate ‘humanity’, ‘transcendence’ and ‘temperance’ with virtue. This raises the 
question of whether to some extent, these more specialist virtue terms have limited utility in 
the general population, though it must be acknowledged that a different sample might deem 
these features of virtue in a replication. 
The free-listing task used here can be contrasted with the approach of Ruch and Proyer 
(2015), who took the existence of the character strengths of the VIA for granted, and asked 
participants only to re-categorise these strengths into the six superordinate virtue categories. 
Findings from the current study call into question whether these character strengths (and indeed 
the superordinate virtue categories of the VIA) are named instinctively by laypeople. On this 
basis, it seems plausible to suggest that some categories of the VIA classification may not 
adequately reflect a lay view, and that the classification could be overdetermined by a priori 
assessments of what ‘experts’ consider representative of both subordinate ‘character strengths’ 
and superordinate virtue categories. 
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Table 1: Frequency, Centrality and Valence scores for the 99 key virtue features, as ordered by 
combined frequency and centrality rankings. 
 





















48.15 4.66 6.68 1 1 2 
Trust/Trust
worthy 
16.93 4.62 6.62 5 2 7 
Good/Good
ness 
45.50 4.63 6.46 2 9 11 
Moral/mora
lity 
41.80 4.47 6.48 3 8 11 
Kindness 24.34 4.7 6.50 4 7 11 
Integrity 12.70 4.58 6.53 8 5 13 
Caring 13.76 4.62 6.34 6 11 17 
Decency 8.47 4.68 6.56 19 3 22 
Thoughtful/
Considerate 
10.05 4.42 6.28 16 14 30 
Helpful 12.70 4.67 6.13 8 26 34 
Honour 10.58 4.63 6.17 15 20 35 
Patience 12.70 4.5 6.00 8 30 38 
Ethical 12.17 4.43 6.05 11 27 38 
Loyalty 6.88 4.62 6.23 22 16 38 
Respect/res
pectable 
6.88 4.69 6.17 22 20 42 
Principles/P
rincipled 




4.76 4.89 6.54 38 4 42 
Compassio
nate 
5.82 4.73 6.34 34 11 45 
Selfless 11.11 4.67 5.89 14 34 48 
Empathy/S
ympathy 
6.35 4.33 6.18 30 19 49 
Generosity/
Giving 
13.23 4.44 5.77 7 43 50 
Standards 6.35 4.25 6.17 30 20 50 
Love/Lovin
g 
9.52 4.17 5.89 18 34 52 
Good 
behaviour 
5.29 4.5 6.22 36 17 53 
Fairness/eq
uality 
4.23 4.5 6.31 40 13 53 
Faith/faithf
ul 
6.88 4.23 5.88 22 36 58 
Value(s) 3.17 4.33 6.37 48 10 58 
Reliable 4.23 4.38 6.15 40 25 65 
Understand
ing 
3.17 4.33 6.17 48 20 68 
Genuine/Si
ncere 
2.12 4.75 6.52 64 6 70 
Gratitude/A
ppreciation 





6.35 4.1 5.84 30 41 71 
Justice 2.65 4.2 6.2 54 18 72 




6.88 4.46 5.53 22 53 75 
Upright/ups
tanding 
3.70 4.29 5.96 45 31 76 
Charity 6.88 4.08 5.47 22 57 79 
Friendly/Fri
endliness 
6.35 4 5.67 30 49 79 
Lawful/La
w-abiding 
2.12 4 6.27 64 15 79 
Happiness/J
oy/Content 
11.64 4.5 5.20 12 68 80 
Clean(livin
g) 
4.76 4.22 5.72 38 46 84 
Pure/Purity 6.88 4.69 5.28 22 64 86 
Humility/M
odesty 
3.17 4.5 5.86 48 38 86 
Forgiveness 2.65 4.4 5.95 54 32 86 
Dignity 3.70 4.29 5.75 45 45 90 
Dependable 2.12 5 6.05 64 27 91 
Polite/Polit
eness 
2.65 4.4 5.86 54 38 92 
Worthy 3.70 4.43 5.56 45 52 97 
Righteous 6.88 3.46 4.93 22 76 98 
Quality 4.23 4.5 5.4 40 58 98 
Chastity 11.64 3.76 4.28 12 89 101 
Openness 3.17 4.17 5.53 48 53 101 
Warm(th) 2.65 4.8 5.70 54 47 101 
Sharing 2.65 4.2 5.68 54 48 102 
Support/sup
portive 
1.59 4 6.02 76 29 105 
Commitme
nt 
2.12 4.25 5.77 64 43 107 
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Excellence 5.82 4.73 4.94 34 75 109 




4.23 3.87 5.17 40 70 110 
Likeable/Ni
ce 
3.17 4.33 5.33 48 62 110 
Religion/rel
igious 
10.05 3.63 3.41 16 95 111 
Strength 4.23 4.25 5.10 40 71 111 
Listens 1.59 4.33 5.88 76 36 112 
Self-control 1.59 4.33 5.85 76 40 116 
Intelligent/
Smart 
5.29 4.3 4.64 36 81 117 
Fidelity 1.59 4.67 5.82 76 42 118 
Admirable 2.12 4.75 5.51 64 55 119 
Wisdom 2.65 4.6 5.27 54 66 120 




2.65 3.2 5.10 54 71 125 
Hope 2.12 3.75 5.29 64 63 127 
Approacha
ble 
1.59 4 5.62 76 51 127 
Innocence 3.17 4 4.56 48 85 133 
Tact/tactful 1.59 3.67 5.38 76 59 135 
Prudence 2.12 4.25 5.07 64 73 137 
Calm 1.59 4.33 5.34 76 61 137 
Altruism 1.59 4.33 5.28 76 64 140 
Beliefs 2.12 3.5 4.74 64 79 143 
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Correct 1.59 4 5.26 76 67 143 
Piety 2.65 3 4.24 54 90 144 
Free 2.12 4.75 4.67 64 80 144 
Well-being 1.59 4.33 5.20 76 68 144 
Power/Pow
erful 
2.65 3.5 3.71 54 93 147 
Teachable 1.59 4.33 5.01 76 74 150 
Smug/smug
ness 
2.65 1.8 2.65 54 98 152 
Candor 1.59 3.67 4.90 76 77 153 
Forthright 1.59 3 4.78 76 78 154 
Conformity
/Obedience 
1.59 3.67 4.64 76 81 157 
Self-
righteous 
2.12 1.75 3.54 64 94 158 
Noble/nobil
ity 
1.59 5 4.61 76 83 159 
Wealth 2.12 4 2.99 64 96 160 
Asset 1.59 4.33 4.58 76 84 160 
Pride 1.59 3.33 4.44 76 86 162 
Fun/Funny 1.59 4.67 4.33 76 87 163 
Healthy 1.59 4 4.29 76 88 164 
Frugal/Thri
fty 
1.59 3.33 4.10 76 91 167 
Angelic 1.59 4.33 3.99 76 92 168 
Gullible 1.59 1.33 2.80 76 97 173 
Arrogant/B
oastful 






Table 2. Percentage of participants naming ‘character strengths’ exhibiting the six virtues of 
the VIA classification. 
VIA ‘Virtue’ Category VIA ‘Character 
Strength’ 
Percentage of 
Participants (to nearest 
whole number) 
Wisdom and Knowledge 
(Cognitive strengths that 
entail the acquisition and use 
of knowledge)* 
Creativity 0% 
 Curiosity 0% 
 Judgement 0% 
 Love of learning 0% 
 Perspective 0% 
Courage (Emotional 
strengths that involve the 
exercise of will to 
accomplish goals in the face 
of opposition) 
Bravery 8% (courage)** 
 Perseverance 3% 
(persistence/determination) 
 Honesty 48% 
 Zest 0% 
Humanity (Interpersonal 
strengths that involve 
tending and befriending 
others) 
Love 10% 
 Kindness 24% 
 Social Intelligence 0% 
Justice (Civic strengths 
that underlie healthy 
community life)*** 
Teamwork 0% 
 Fairness 4% 
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 Leadership 0% 
Temperance (Strengths 
that protect against excess) 
Forgiveness 3% 
 Humility 3% 
 Prudence 2% 
 Self-regulation 2% (self-control) 
Transcendence 
(Strengths that forge 
connections to the larger 





 Gratitude 8% 
 Hope  2% 
 Humour 2% (funny) 
 Spirituality 3% (piety); 10% 
(religion) 
Note. *While none of the participants named any of the ‘character strengths’ of the virtue of 
wisdom, 3% identified wisdom itself. ** ‘Bravery’, ‘valour’ and ‘courage’ were counted 
together. *** While none of the participants named any of the ‘character strengths’ of the 







Study 2 assessed the centrality (importance) of the virtue features from Study 1. We 
presented participants with the 99 key virtue features and examined the degree to which 
centrality ratings of features converged across participants. If the concept of virtue has a 




Two-hundred-and-five adults participated via an online survey. Participants were recruited 
via a crowdsourcing website and were paid £1.50 in return for participation. All participants 
were UK citizens. Participants from Study 1 were excluded from participation. Of the sample, 
55% of participants were female, 94% were White-British and ages ranged from 18 – 84 years 
(M = 47 years). Regarding participants’ highest qualification, 50% reported having GCSEs, A-
levels or vocational qualifications, 37% of the sample had a higher education degree and 6% 
had completed a postgraduate qualification. In terms of religion, 51% of the sample was 
Christian and 36% were Atheist or Agnostic. Of those who identified with a religion, 26% 
indicated they practiced it. 
 
Design and procedure 
Participants were presented with the 99 key virtue features that emerged from Study 1. 
Following the next stage of the prototype analysis methodology, they were then asked to rate 
how central each feature was to the concept of virtue using an 8-point Likert scale (1 = not at 
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all central to 8 = extremely central). The survey took an average of 11 minutes. Feature order 
was randomized across participants. 
 
Results and Discussion  
Mean centrality ratings for all 99 key virtue features are displayed in Table 1. To test the 
consistency of responses across participants, we conducted reliability tests. These tests revealed 
high internal consistency (intraclass correlation and α = .98 (participants as items, features as 
cases)) suggesting that participants largely agreed on which features are central to virtue. 
Further analyses revealed a medium, significant, positive correlation between centrality scores 
in Study 2 and frequency scores in Study 1 (r = .37, p < .01); features rated as most central in 
Study 2 tended to be named with greater frequency in Study 1. 
Importantly, this is not the first prototype analysis conducted within the moral domain. 
Walker and Pitts (1998) generated prototypical ratings for ‘highly moral persons’ and Lapsley 
and Lasky (2001) explored what is typical of persons with ‘good character’ (see Table 3).5 
When comparing features of the current analyses to the two previous analyses there is 
considerable overlap. Examples of features that appear in all three studies include moral values 
such as ‘honest’, ‘kind(ness)’, ‘integrity’, ‘genuine’, ‘sincere’, ‘empathy’, ‘loyal(ty)’ and 
‘respect’, as well as adjectives such as ‘law abiding’, ‘ethical’, and ‘upstanding’. 
There are, however, several features that appear specific to the concept of virtue. Examples 
of virtue-specific features include ‘excellence’ and ‘noble’, and specific virtues, such as 
 
5 Walker & Pitts’ (1998) Canadian sample consisted of 120 people drawn equally from three age groups: 18-25 
years; 35-55 years and 65 – 94 years. Sixty-eight percent of the gender-balanced sample were Caucasian. 
Lapsley & Lasky’s (2001) American sample consisted of 121 individuals (69% female), ranging in age from 18- 
48 (M = 21.48). Eight-nine percent of the predominantly undergraduate sample were white. 
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‘gratitude’, ‘charity’, ‘prudence’ and ‘hope’. Other unique features of virtue included 
‘trait/characteristic/attribute’ and ‘quality’, mapping onto the understanding of virtues as 
relatively stable and consistent valued positive traits (Kristjánsson, 2015). 
To examine the degree of correlation between virtue features, features of moral persons, and 
features of good character we conducted a bivariate correlation. Results illustrated that there 
was a medium positive correlation between features of virtue and moral persons (r = .47, p < 
.01) and a strong positive correlation between virtue and good character features (r = .74, p < 
.001). The correlation between features of moral persons and good character was medium and 
positive (r = .36, p < .05). These results suggest there is a larger degree of overlap between 
virtue and good character than between either virtue and moral persons or moral persons and 
good character.6 
The greater correspondence between virtue and good character is not surprising. Morality can 
be based on rules, consequences and (in the case of virtue ethics) on enduring positive 
dispositions. While Walker and Pitts (1998) asked participants to generate features about a 
moral person (rather than morality per se), it seems likely that the reference to ‘moral’ 
engendered less correspondence in features than was found between virtue and good 
character, both of which necessarily narrow attention towards mostly desirable human 
attributes, traits or qualities. 
 
Table 3. Top ten features by centrality for the ‘virtue’ prototype study and associated centrality 




6 It should be noted, however, that the data from these three studies derives from three countries (USA, Canada 
and UK) and span almost two decades. The ideal study would compare data from one country at one time-point 









Honest* 6.68 5.77 6.44 
Trust/trustworthy 6.62 5.33 6.38 
Decency; decent 6.56  5.63 
Doing the right 
thing; concerned 
about doing right 
6.54 5.96  
Integrity 6.53 5.52 5.59 
Genuine** 6.52 4.96 6.29 
Kind(ness) 6.5 4.78 5.92 
Moral/morality 6.48  6.07 
Good(ness); good 
natured 




6.37 5.87 5.49 
 
Note. * For the virtue sample this feature was ‘honest/truthful’ 





Study 3a aimed to demonstrate that feature centrality (based on the sum-of-ranks metric 
shown in Table 1) affected cognition of the concept of virtue. The sum-of-ranks metric 
combines a feature’s rank by frequency with its rank by centrality).  It will be recalled from the 
introduction that to validate whether a concept has a prototypical structure, it must be shown 
that feature centrality influences cognition relating to the concept. Explicit and implicit tasks 
can both be used to corroborate a concept’s prototypical structure. The method used in Study 
3a constituted an explicit cognitive task.  We followed the procedure outlined in Study 3 of an 
earlier prototype analysis of gratitude (SecondAuthor et al, 2014). 
Participants were presented with 16 character descriptions (A - P). Four contained features 
with a high combined centrality and frequency rank (the sum-of-ranks metric) from Studies 1 
and 2; these formed the ‘Central’ condition. Three more conditions were created by choosing 
‘Peripheral’ features from the middle of Table 1; ‘Marginal’ features (from the bottom third) 
and ‘Remote’ features (those named by one or two participants in Study 1).   
After reading each character description, participants answered seven questions gauging 
their impression of the person described. The key question was ‘How VIRTUOUS is this 
person?’ In this study one would expect fictional characters displaying more central features to 




One-hundred-and-five adults participated via an online survey. All participants were UK 
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citizens and were recruited via a crowdsourcing website and were paid £1.50 in return for 
participation. Participants from Study 1 or 2 were excluded from participation. Of the sample, 
41% were female. Ages ranged from 18 – 73 years (M = 45 years). When asked about their 
highest qualification, 47% reported having GCSEs, A-levels or vocational qualifications, 35% 
of the sample had a higher education degree and 13% had completed a postgraduate 
qualification. Ninety-two percent of the sample was White-British. Forty-six percent were 
Christian and 42% were Atheist or Agnostic. Of those who identified with a religion, 25% 
indicated they practiced it.  
 
Design and procedure 
Each of the 16 fictitious characters was described with three key virtue features. The features 
were either central, peripheral, or marginal, based on the ‘sum of ranks’ metric. The 33 features 
with the lowest combined rank of frequency and centrality scores were considered central, the 
next 33 were considered peripheral, and the remaining 33 were deemed marginal. Features 
named once or twice in Study 1 constituted remote features. Selection of features for each 
condition was based on their relative location on the sum of ranks list and how well they could 
be combined with other features to make a realistic fictional character. Based on the principles 
of prototype analysis, the exact choice of features is fairly redundant, rather it is the level of 
centrality that is crucial to the responses and comparisons made.  The valence of features in 
each character description was matched across the four conditions and a one-way ANOVA 
revealed no significant difference between them (F (3, 44) = .149, p =.93).  
Every participant was presented with all 16 fictional characters and, after reading each 
description, participants answered seven questions (see Figure 1). The key question linking the 
concept of virtue with cognitive processing of the character descriptions was ‘How 
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VIRTUOUS is this person?’ Five items tapped well-established personality traits (questions 2 
- 6) and the remaining question aimed to examine the correlation between the concepts of 
moral(ity) and virtue. Questions were answered on a Likert scale, from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
extremely. Each participant undertook all 16 trials i.e. all participants received all 16 character 
descriptions. The order of the trials and questions were randomized. The survey took an 
average of 21 minutes.7 
 
Figure 1. Examples of character descriptions across the four conditions and the seven 
questions gauging participants’ impressions. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We analysed responses to the question ‘How VIRTUOUS is this person?’ in terms of each 
of the four levels of centrality. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant difference 
in virtue rating between the four levels (F (3, 282) = 35.68, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .255) and a 
 
7 The same participants took part in Studies 3a and 3b. This figure represents the average time taken to complete 
both studies.  
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significant linear trend (F (1, 104) = 72.89, p < .001 𝜂𝜂p2 = .412).  Further planned analyses 
(using Bonferroni correction) revealed that although there was a significant difference across 
the four levels, results did not follow the pattern observed in a prototype analysis of gratitude 
(SecondAuthor et al., 2014) or which Gregg and colleagues (2008) found for modesty. In both 
these studies, mean ratings significantly decreased between central and peripheral conditions; 
peripheral and marginal conditions; and marginal and remote conditions. In the current study 
however, means in the central condition were significantly different from marginal and remote 
ratings (p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .505; p <. 001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑 = .511), but not from peripheral ratings 
(p = .193, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑 = .069). We observed the anticipated decrease in rating from peripheral 
to marginal (p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑 = .460).  However, we did not observe significantly different 
ratings between marginal and remote conditions (see Figure 2). 
We conducted post-hoc tests to examine the difference in mean scores for individual 
character descriptions. Notably, there was a greater number of features sharing the same ‘sum 
of ranks’ in this study relative to the previous exploration of gratitude that informed Study 3a 
(from SecondAuthor et al., 2014).  This greater overlap in ‘sum of ranks’ scores could suggest 
a less obvious split between the four conditions for the concept of virtue. The final column in 
Table 1 shows the sum-of ranks metric increasing across the named features. Crucially 
however, the difference between the sum-of-ranks becomes less clearly delineated (as Table 1 
shows) suggesting the metric may not distinguish clearly at the boundaries between the four 
conditions: central, peripheral, marginal and remote. 
To examine whether some character descriptions were resulting in more extreme scores than 
others within the same condition, we examined mean scores for each individual character 
description (Persons A – P). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
mean ratings between the individual character descriptions (F (15, 1560) = 13.35, p < .001, 𝜂𝜂p2 
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= .114).  Further post-hoc analyses (using Bonferroni correction) compared differences 
between ratings for each character description, Persons A-P (see Figure 3).  
Notably, Person E, depicting peripheral features of ‘is charitable’, ‘is forgiving’ and ‘is 
pure’, had the highest overall mean virtue rating (M = 5.86). This is significantly higher than 
that of Person A8 (p < .05, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .360), Person B9 (p < .05, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .361) and Person 
D10 (p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .385), all of which depict central features.  
Within the peripheral condition, there were significant differences in rating between Person 
E and Person F11, p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .449); between Person E and Person H12, p < .001, 
Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .885); and between Person G13 and H (p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .645). Thus, there 
was little consistency in virtue scores within the peripheral condition (see Figure 3). Post-hoc 
tests indicate that the virtue scores for Person E and for Person H in particular, impacted on the 
overall difference between scores assigned to character descriptions depicting either central or 
peripheral features. In other words, the uncharacteristically high virtue rating ascribed to 
Person E and the atypically low ascription of virtue to Person H (both of which were made up 
of descriptors from the peripheral condition) deviate from the pattern of scoring one would 
have predicted. 
Responses to ‘How MORAL is this person?’ showed a pattern closer to what one would 
anticipate for prototypical concepts. Descriptions containing central features were rated as 
more ‘moral’ than those comprised of peripheral features (M = 5.63 and 5.51 respectively, p < 
.05, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .191). Similarly, there was a significant decrease in ‘moral’ scores between 
 
8 Person A: ‘honest’, ‘has standards’, ‘thoughtful’. 
9 Person B: ‘trustworthy’, ‘has integrity’, ‘conscientious’ 
10 Person D: ‘patient’, ‘loving’, ‘ethical’. 
11 Person F: ‘positive’, ‘law-abiding’, ‘modest’ 
12 Person H: ‘friendly’, ‘happy’, ‘admirable’ 
13 Person G: ‘sincere, ‘has warmth’, ‘religious’ 
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peripheral and marginal conditions (mean difference = .43, p < .001, Cohen’s 𝑑𝑑= .510). There 
was no difference between marginal and remote conditions.  
To explore responses to the question on virtue in more depth and to examine whether 
demographic variables impacted upon the findings, we conducted a mixed ANOVA with 
centrality (central, peripheral, marginal and remote) as the within-subjects variable and gender 
(female, male), age group (18 – 30 years; 31 – 45; 46 – 60 and over 60) and practice religion 
(yes, no) as between-subjects variables. The analysis revealed a main effect of centrality (as 
noted above) but no main effect of gender, age or practice religion. The results did demonstrate, 
however, a significant interaction between centrality, gender, and practice religion (F (3, 129) 
= .772, p < .05, 𝜂𝜂p2 = .086). The patterns across demographic groups were extremely varied 
and ultimately demonstrate that there is no standard way of responding to the person 
descriptions across conditions (see Figures in supplementary appendix). 
We explored whether there was any relationship between participants’ responses to ‘How 
VIRTUOUS is this person’ and the six other questions. A bivariate correlation revealed a large, 
positive correlation between virtuousness and moral (r = .80, p < .001); virtuousness and 
openness (r =.59, p < .001); virtuousness and conscientiousness (r = .70, p < .001); and 
virtuousness and agreeableness (r = .74, p < .001). There was a medium negative correlation 
between virtuousness and neuroticism (r = −.34, p < .001). There was no correlation with 
extroversion (p = .08, p = .125). Thus, there was a strong similarity between how participants 
rated the character descriptions in terms of how virtuous they considered them and how moral, 
open, conscientious and agreeable they considered them, echoing earlier findings on the 
relationship of agreeableness and openness to morality (McCrae & John, 1992). 
Results from Study 3a did not corroborate the prototypicality of the concept of virtue. In 
particular, as we have seen, there was a lack of consistency in the virtue ratings assigned to the 
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character descriptions in the peripheral condition (E, F, G and H). If these results are compared 
with those from a prototype analysis of gratitude (SecondAuthor et al., 2014), it may have been 
easier for participants to aggregate an impression of a person description across more closely 
related gratitude words, than it was to assign a single Likert score across the three virtue words. 
Walker and Pitts (1998) noted the ‘limited explanatory power’ of single-word or brief-phrase 
descriptions ‘in expressing the complex aspects of moral functioning, for example, 
conditionalities or relationships among attributes’ (p. 415, our italics). This may have impacted 
on Study 3a, where three individual virtue features were clustered together to form each 
description. The combining of virtues into a character description may have affected how 
participants perceived and judged those persons overall. Participants may have perceived 
persons to be more (or less) virtuous than the sum of the three individual virtues.   
 





Figure 3. Mean ratings for ‘How VIRTUOUS is this person?’ across character descriptions 





Following Fehr (1988), Lapsley and Lasky (2001) and Lambert et al.., (2009), we conducted 
a recognition memory experiment to determine whether feature centrality affected recognition 
memory of features. Study 3b therefore constituted an implicit task.  
Participants were presented with 40 words and were asked whether each had been presented 
in the previous character descriptions. These 40 words consisted of 10 central and 10 peripheral 
features presented in the previous character description task, and 10 central and 10 peripheral 
features that had not been presented previously. If the concept of virtue is prototypically 
organized, central features that had not been presented would be ‘falsely recognized’ 
(inaccurately identified as having been presented in the character descriptions) more frequently 
than peripheral features that had not been presented previously. Recognition memory for 





The same participants took part as in Study 3a. 
 
Design and procedure 
Ten central and ten peripheral features presented in Study 3a’s character descriptions were 
selected. Additionally, ten central and ten peripheral features that were not presented in the 
character descriptions were chosen. Presented and non-presented central features were matched 
on centrality and valence scores, as were presented and non-presented peripheral features. 
Paired sample t-tests revealed no significant differences across presented and non-presented 
features in terms of centrality or valence.14 
Participants were instructed: 
“You will be presented with a list of words; some of these words you will have seen in the 
character descriptions in the last section of the questionnaire, and some of these words have 
not yet been presented. Thinking back to the character descriptions you have just seen, please 
decide which of the words listed below have been presented as part of the descriptions and 
which words have not.” 
 
14 Paired sample t-tests revealed: no significant difference between centrality scores across presented and non-
presented central features (M= 6.31 and 6.18 respectively, t (9) = 1.56, p = .15); no significant difference 
between valence scores across presented and non-presented central features (M= 4.46 and 4.53, t (9) = -1.27, p = 
.24); no significant difference between centrality scores across presented and non-presented peripheral features 
(M = 5.49 and 5.51, t (9) = -.07, p = .95); no significant difference between valence scores across presented and 
non-presented peripheral features (M=4.37 and 4.24, t (9) = .69, p = .51). 
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Participants were presented with a word, for example ‘Thoughtful’, and prompted to select 
either ‘Presented in character description’ or ‘NOT presented in character description’. Each 




To determine whether feature centrality affected recognition memory, we compared false 
recognition of non-presented central features with non-presented peripheral features (M = 3.62 
and M = 2.82 respectively), and recognition of presented central features with presented 
peripheral features (M=3.78 and M=3.63 respectively). A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of presentation, whereby items that had been presented 
previously were more likely to be recognized by participants than those that had not (M = 3.70 
and M = 3.22, F (1, 104) = 13.09, p < .001). As per the hypothesized effects signposted in the 
Study 3b description, there was no significant difference in overall recognition scores based on 
centrality of items (Central M = 3.71, Peripheral M = 3.21, F (1, 104) = 1.46, p = .23). Also in 
line with the hypothesized effects, there was a significant interaction between centrality and 
presentation whereby significantly more non-presented central features were falsely 
recognized compared with non-presented peripheral features (F (1, 104) = 4.91, p = .03). 
 
Discussion 
In contrast to the explicit character description method of Study 3a, the implicit recognition 
memory method of Study 3b corroborated a prototypical structure by showing that feature 
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centrality affected cognition of the concept of virtue.15 Therefore, findings from Study 3b 
substantiated virtue’s prototypical structure while results from Study 3a did not. What might 
account for these different conclusions? Studies 3a and b describe different kinds of task. Study 
3a required participants to make explicit judgements about whether the three-word characters 
described in the person descriptions were ‘virtuous’16 whereas Study 3b was an implicit task 
that required participants to recognise whether they had/had not previously seen virtue features. 
One explanation for the divergent results could be that there is a ‘lower threshold' for 
recognising a given word as virtuous than there is for making a considered decision about 
whether a person is virtuous, based on three descriptors alone.  
While the person descriptor method of Study 3a corroborated prototypicality of gratitude 
(SecondAuthor et al, 2014) it may yield a less reliable pattern where the concept under scrutiny 
is broader and associated with a larger number of features. SecondAuthor et al. (2014) reported 
63 key features of gratitude, while Gregg et al. (2008) reported 48 key modesty features - half 
as many as were found for the concept of virtue in the present study (99).  Participants’ varying 
judgements about whether the features (both individually and collectively) are deemed 
characteristic of a virtuous person are more likely to operate in the explicit person description 
task than in the implicit recognition task.  Walker and Pitts’ (1998) point about ‘relationships 
among attributes’ is also pertinent; persons may be deemed more (or less) virtuous than the 




15 It should be acknowledged that only two categories (central and peripheral) were compared here, as opposed 
to central, peripheral, marginal and remote categories in Study 3a. 
16 And moral, open, conscientious, extroverted, agreeable and neurotic 
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The current study does not demonstrate conclusively whether the concept of virtue is 
prototypically organised, though it should be noted that Lapsley and Lasky (2001) also reached 
different conclusions with the two methods they used to attempt to corroborate the 
prototypicality of ‘good character’ (recognition memory and recall memory). Therefore, the 
discrepant findings in this study are by no means unprecedented. A review of all methods of 
assessing prototypicality, (implicit and explicit) is needed to shed light on those methods which 
report relatively consistent findings and those which have been mixed, since whether 
prototypicality of a given concept is corroborated may in fact be heavily influenced by the 
method selected. 
In the course of examining whether the concept of virtue is prototypically organised, the 
current study has brought to light discrepancies between features that laypeople spontaneously 
associate with virtue in a free-listing task and the human excellences that make up the VIA-IS 
– the dominant virtue classification currently in use. In Study 1’s free-listing, participants 
named general features of virtue such as ‘good/goodness’ and ‘moral/morality’ as well as 
prototypical virtues such as ‘honesty’ and ‘kindness’.  However, the distinctive VIA character 
strengths of ‘creativity’, ‘curiosity’, ‘judgement’, ‘love of learning’, ‘perspective’, ‘zest’, 
‘social intelligence’, ‘teamwork’, and ‘leadership’, deemed ‘distinguishable routes’ to the 
virtues of wisdom, courage, humanity and justice respectively, did not feature in participants’ 
free-listing of features associated with virtue, which one might have expected if laypeople see 
these strengths as being typical examples (‘exemplifications’) of higher-order categories of 
virtues as is presupposed by the VIA-IS. 
Ruch and Proyer (2015) took the existence and organisational structure of the character 
strengths and virtues of the VIA-IS as read. As such, their approach is far more likely to affirm 
the VIA classification, even if individuals assign strengths to different virtues than those 
originally presupposed by the classification. The same is true of factor analyses of the VIA-IS 
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(for example McGrath, 2015; McGrath & Walker, 2016; McGrath, Greenberg and Hall-
Simmonds, 2018), which set out from the position of broad acceptance of the classification 
(though with grounds for excluding strengths if they do not load onto the higher order virtue 
categories/factors). Both approaches therefore give initial assent to the classification which 
they then test in their different ways. 
In contrast, by adopting a free-listing approach, the current study starts out from a ‘neutral’ 
position and offers a first step towards defining the concept of virtue (and prototypical 
instantiations of virtues) from a lay perspective. This study highlights some incongruities 
between ‘specialists’’ understanding of strengths and virtues, and non-expert views. 
In this connection, it will be recalled that in Study 1 no participants in our lay sample named 
‘humanity’, ‘temperance’ or ‘transcendence’ as features of virtue, though one could reasonably 
expect at least some ‘experts’ (philosophers or psychologists) to have done so. This raises the 
question of whether to some extent, these more specialist virtue terms have limited utility in 
the general population. Indeed, this may be true of the concept of ‘virtue’ more broadly, which 
may represent a concept which is perhaps not widely used by laypeople in everyday contexts. 
Replication across diverse populations and cultures would be necessary to examine this further. 
For instance, might there be fewer discrepancies between older laypeople and specialists than 
between younger laypeople and specialists, or between participants’ with different educational 
backgrounds? Might there be substantial differences in identifying features of virtue within the 
‘specialist’ category itself - for instance between philosophers and (positive) psychologists? 
These current findings are based on a UK-only population, however, prototype analyses 
have been used to identify cross-cultural similarities and differences in how a construct is 
understood (e.g., Fehr, 1988; SecondAuthor et al., 2014). Therefore, future research could 
utilise a similar prototype approach to examine the extent to which virtues are universally 
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recognised. However, it should be noted that, whilst prototype analyses offer an important 
insight into conceptions of a construct, a deeper understanding of conceptualisations of virtue 
might be gleaned through in-depth qualitative interviews or studies of moral exemplars 
embodying these excellences of character (Colby & Damon, 1992; Damon & Colby, 2015). 
To conclude, the question of how the general public spontaneously understand the concept 
of virtue is under-scrutinized. The current study attempts to address this and throws into relief 
some incongruities between the human excellences of the VIA classification and the features 
laypeople instinctively associate with virtue. What is proposed here is a ‘paradigm shift’ away 
from research that uses the VIA classification as the basis for testing understandings of virtue 
(top down), to a bottom-up approach where laypeople’ spontaneous understanding of the 
concept of virtue is tapped. In-depth interviews of and discussions with laypeople about moral 
exemplars promote deeper understanding of conceptualisations of virtue, extending the 
prototype methodology used here. 
The findings of this study have implications for self-report virtue measures, such as the VIA-
IS character strengths survey, in terms of the provision of clear definitions and direction to 
participants. The current results could also offer guidance with regard to modifying existing 
measures and classifications to better reflect lay interpretations; in line with the aforementioned 
‘paradigm shift’, a measurement tool that is built in conjunction with lay people’s conceptions 
might allow for a more coordinated and harmonized framework for assessing virtue concepts. 
In the absence of such a contribution, we risk perpetuating conceiving and measuring human 
excellences in ways that ‘construct’ character strengths in line with a model which may not 
ultimately reflect what ordinary people really think virtue is.  
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